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Throughout history we have seen drastic changes in methods for combating 
terrorism; however, as a society we have never been able to find an effective solution. In 
recent years we have seen countries use community based policing in an effort to fight 
terrorism at home; how would adopting community based policing efforts help or hurt 
countries throughout the Middle East in combating terrorism? I believe that 
implementing community based policing into these countries would drastically improve 
civilian and government relationships as well as hinder terrorists’ ability to recruit new 
member from these areas. I conduct a multi-case study then apply those models to the 
country of Yemen to simulate how the policies would affect the ability to combat Al-
Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula. For this, I compare community based policing in the 
United States, the United Kingdom and Israel to get a better picture of which model 
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 In today’s world, every time someone turns on the news terrorism is talked about 
in some capacity. It has become common place to hear about terrorist attacks around the 
world or the wars being fought against terrorist groups throughout the Middle East. As 
the issue becomes more salient, everyone develops an opinion of how to fight against 
terrorism. With so many different opinions on how to rid the world of terrorism, it forces 
society to rank the ways different places believe in fighting terrorism. For example, the 
majority of the American society often believes that the way to fight against terror is 
through warlike mentality and use of direct force against the terrorist organization, 
particularly the use of the military in a foreign land but after over a decade of fighting 
against terrorist groups with this thought process the question must be asked if there is a 
better way to combat terrorist and the reach that they possess.  
 Yemen is currently one of the hotbeds for terrorism, particularly for the group al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP is one of the most dangerous off shoots 
of al-Qaeda both within the country it operates as well as abroad. This current state of 
Yemen is a major factor in the success of AQAP, particularly since it controls nearly as 
much territory as the more legitimate government of Yemen. At the current point in their 
short history, Yemen is having serious trouble providing for its own civilians opening the 
door to allow AQAP to gain legitimacy with the people of Yemen. In the southern 
regions of Yemen, where AQAP is a pseudo government actor, the lack of government 
services and support are virtually nonexistent. AQAP continues to take advantage by 
providing the people with infrastructure needs like roads and water. The ability to provide 
2 
 
these basic needs, AQAP gains support and safety from the citizens of these regions. As 
AQAP continues to push for legitimate power, citizens have begun to accept some of the 
terrorists’ extreme views because it is the only way to continue getting the vital services 
they need to survive. The lack of true governmental control in the region also completely 
tears down the ability for the civilians to trust and respect the government. With the 
governmental failure on every level, this is where implementing a method of community 
policing could take a weakness and make it into strength. Community policing is based 
on the philosophy that “the police are the people and the people are the police and crime 
prevention is possible without heavy intrusion into citizen’s lives” (Lewis 2011). 
Alternatively, if left in its current state, Yemen may not be able to survive as a country. 
However, there are numerous ideas on how to help solve the problem. 
 While the literature is filled with well thought out strategies that could be 
implemented for combating terrorism, the status quo seems to focus on letting the United 
States led the effort, instead of allowing the Yemeni Government to help itself. Plans 
from authors like Zimmerman (2016), Sohlman (2012) and McIntosh (2015) all include a 
United States led offensive on AQAP. We have seen this theory in practice over the past 
decade without much success in Afghanistan and Iraq. This seems to be an idea that is 
less popular because most of the writing comes from a western prospective, and there is a 
tendency to want to be the star of the show. While this may be a possible step, I believe it 
is more important to give the Yemeni people the chance and ability to fight for 
themselves with the US taking an advisory role. In this advisory role, you allow the 
Yemeni Government to solve the issues and gain more legitimacy throughout the global 
community. Some current authors have written that community based policing can help 
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in counter-terror efforts throughout The United States, England, and Israel. Gill (2014) 
and Grabosky (2008) both agree that community policing helps improve the civilian and 
governmental trust. The community based policing models help to provide the legitimacy 
from the global community because of its ability to solve a lot of the societal issues that 
the Yemeni Government has brought upon itself. 
 Therefore, if counter-terrorism has been unsuccessful thus far; how would 
community based policing tactics help or hinder the country of Yemen? This paper 
provides an alternative plan to combat the presence of AQAP through an implementation 
of a community based policing model. Community based policing models differ 
throughout the world as to how it is used to combat terrorism. Through a multi-case 
study, it will be evident that community based policing in England, Israel, and The 
United States is a viable solution to combat terrorism. The differences in the plans 
however leave this study to decide which model would be most effectively implemented 
into Yemen. The Israeli model is one that is more built in to the fabric of the policing and 
military structure because of the constant threat the country faces from terrorism much 
like Yemen. The United Kingdom model is a multi-pronged system designed to stop the 
grass route movements and the recruiting abilities of the terrorist organizations that make 
them more dangerous. The United States model is a hybrid model that takes civilian 
volunteer power along with the fighting to stop homegrown terrorism to completely 
eliminate the threat of terrorism. I believe that the most successful counterterror plan for 
Yemen is a community based policing model that allows Yemen to deal with its internal 
strife while slowing the growth, and eventually eliminating, AQAP.  
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 To begin I review the background of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
theories of community policing. Then I explore the current literature that is relevant to 
the topic at hand. Following the literature review, I provide the theoretical framework for 
why community based policing would help the country of Yemen combat its problems 
with AQAP. Lastly, I review the data that was collected and analyze what solution would 
likely come out of community policing in Yemen. 
Background 
Yemen is an extremely young country that is still trying to truly figure out there 
place in the world. The northern part of the country gained independence in 1918 from 
the Ottoman Empire and took the name of the Yemen Arab Republic. While the southern 
portion along the Sea of Aden was not relinquished by the British until 1967, they 
became the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. Yemen is directly below Saudi 
Arabia with both the Sea of Aden and the Arabian Sea to the along the sudden border. 
The country finds itself in some state of disarray for the majority of its history. It wasn’t 
until 1990 that the two former colonies decided to unite as the Republic of Yemen, but a 
short four years later they had their first civil war. Luckily this southern secessionist 
movement by the south was quickly quashed and in 2000 they country of Yemen made 
official borders with the Saudi Arabia. Once again, it only took four years before another 
civil war, this time between the northern Shi’a Muslim minority, which only makes up 35 
percent of the population, and the Yemeni Government, who are Sunni Muslims that 
make up 65 percent of the population. It was six years until they reached a cease-fire 
agreement, but this doesn’t end the hostility because another southern secessionist 
movement was reinvigorated in 2008 when they saw corruption leading to high 
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unemployment rates and a poor economy.  This poor economy has seen a drop off of over 
thirty-three billion dollars in the past two years from $106.6 billion to $73.45 billion do 
to the most recent conflict plaguing the country. The on going conflict has also seemingly 
made the Yemeni government powerless when it comes to their own economy as exports 
have been almost completely nullified, accelerated the inflation within the country, made 
food and fuel imports hard to come by and widespread infrastructure failures. The CIA 
world factbook estimate that approximately eighty-two percent of the population in 
Yemen is in need of some sort of humanitarian assistance. 
As noted above, over the past five years the country of Yemen has been in a 
devolving state of emergency that has resulted in a civil war. Since 2011, a failed 
political transition weakened the Yemeni Government enough to allow the rise of Al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) throughout the country. AQAP has taken 
advantage of the Civil War between the Houthi’s, a group that represents the Zaidi Shia 
minority in Yemen, and the current President Hadi’s regime. The Houthi movement 
“took advantage of the new president’s weakness by taking control of their northern 
heartland of Saada province and neighboring areas” (BBC). The Houthi rebels have been 
able to maintain northern stronghold even now and the pro-government supports have 
been unable to gain any ground in their fight against the rebels. 
“Since the beginning of April 2015, AQAP has taken advantage of the war raging 
between armed Houthis — who have controlled the capital, Sanaa, since September 
2014 — and Hadi’s forces backed by Saudi Arabia” (Despite Arab, US Attacks, AQAP 
Still Holding out in Yemen.) The civil war in Yemen left an opening that AQAP was able 
to capitalize on by creating “its own mini-state, flush with funds from raiding the local 
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central bank and levying taxes at the local port” (Bayoumy et al ). Currently, AQAP has 
adopted similar tactics to those used by the Islamic State to control Syria and Iraq to 
expand its control over the southern portion of Yemen. It creates a further worry that 
slowly AQAP will be able to indoctrinate and recruit more of the local population 
towards its extremist views. One 47-year-old resident of Al Mukalla, the current 
stronghold for AQAP in Southern Yemen, said, “I prefer that al Qaeda stay here, not for 
Al Mukalla to be liberated. The situation is stable, more than any ‘free’ part of Yemen. 
The alternative to al Qaeda is much worse” (Bayoumy et al). This current opinion of the 
AQAP makes them an immediate threat towards the democratic future of Yemen. 
AQAP has gone as far as to try and gain actual recognition as a viable option for a 
Government of Yemen. AQAP sent the current Government of Yemen an official 
government document to sell crude oil while allowing the group to keep 25 percent of the 
profit. The government rejected the offer and maintains limited governmental control in 
the southern portion of Yemen where AQAP has created a pseudo governmental regime 
by “imposing tax and custom tariffs on shippers and traders” (Bayoumy et al). These 
practices have led to a projected daily two million dollars a day earnings to the AQAP. 
They have also begun a drastic change in their antics in relation to civilians. They have 
changed from suicide bombing campaigns and attacks on US bound airliners and now 
they are beginning to extort state run industries, like the oil and mobile phone companies. 
These extortions have led the AQAP to be able to capitalize what Elizabeth Kendall, an 
Oxford University expert on Yemen, calls the “Robin Hood” strategy. The group has 
cancelled payroll taxes in the areas in which it controls, along with often posting 
propaganda of fighters fixing local infrastructure needs like roadways and medical 
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supplies. Doing these things allows the organization to gain support because they are 
providing what the government does not in that area. The payroll tax cuts that the group 
made happen allows an economically struggling area try to rebuild and the infrastructure 
gains helps the citizens feel that their quality of life is improving under AQAP garnering 
the support the group needs to gain legitimacy and keep control over the area.  
Robert Peel is the father of modern community policing and a proponent of social, 
economic and legal reform that has lasted for more than 40 years. Peel’s first political 
post led him to try and fix the inability to fight crime in Ireland. This issue could make or 
break a political career at this time and it allowed Peel to make his career. Peel’s first 
change to the system in Ireland used the magistrates within Ireland to influence the local 
populations to better help law enforcement. These magistrates were already well 
respected leaders of local areas of Ireland. The job of the magistrate is to lead the 
prevention of crime in their locales instead of waiting to suppress the crime. This plan 
however didn’t work because of the inability of the magistrates to perform the duties he 
prescribed for them. Enter the initial version of community policing as he established 
Irish Peace Preservation Force (IPPF). The IPPF was put into place in order to help the 
magistrates complete their tasks or to force the magistrates to perform their duties more 
efficiently. Peel put the IPPF in place because of the burden financially it forced onto the 
local areas to pay for the presence of the new officers. Magistrates took notice and started 
to perform the duties that they were given. As policing got better in certain areas it 
allowed more focus to be put into the truly bad areas. This first lesson allowed Peel to 
change how policing was thought about. Peel went on to write the Nine Peelian 
Principles of Law Enforcement. “These principles essentially held that the police are the 
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people, the people are the police, and crime prevention is possible without heavy 
intrusion into citizens’ lives” (Lewis 2011). The Peelian Principles focus on the 
relationship of the police officer with the citizens they are protecting. The principles were 
given to every new police officer so that they could use them to become a successful 
officer. These are still the same basic principles that are the foundations of modern 
community policing, however, over time these have been adapted to fit the advancement 
of humanity. 
Literature Review 
In this section I review the current literature on three topics, the current counter-
terrorism strategy in the country of Yemen, how the authors believe that counter-
terrorism should be approached, as well as how community policing can be used as a 
counter-terrorism strategy and why it has been successful around the world. The most 
common themes among possible counter-terrorism strategies in Yemen is that, much like 
the current unsuccessful United States led counter terror method, we should taking a war 
like mentality into the battle against terrorism but that has seemed to fail thus far. 
Alternatively, community policing has been shown throughout the world that it is 
possible to fight all forms of crime.  
“Historically, the United States has avoided actions that offer any political 
legitimacy to terrorist organizations for fear that it would contribute to a perception that 
terrorism works and encourages other groups to utilize the tactic” (McIntosh 2014). 
McIntosh points out a severe change in the current United States strategy against al-
Qaeda from previous terror organizations. The Bush Administration has forever changed 
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the political standing that al-Qaeda has on the world stage. As long as the United States 
maintains its status, the more powerful al-Qaeda will continue to become. As McIntosh 
continues “As long as the United States remains at war, similarly motivated individuals 
and groups will see al Qaeda as an entity worth supporting” (McIntosh 2013). This is a 
major topic of discussion within the foreign policy community because it is the next 
evolution in counter-terrorism. President Obama used the term effective destruction when 
describing his administration’s plan to battle against the group. However, the 
administration’s plan is focused on drone attacks, which author Eva Sohlman sees as a 
major problem currently within Yemen. “Many Yemenis see the drones as violating 
Yemen’s national sovereignty, and they are fueling anti-American sentiment. There are 
also concerns that civilian casualties work as recruitment tools for al Qaeda” (Sohlman 
2012). This new plan is actually having a counterproductive effect on what was needed 
within the country. Instead of continuing to build the bond between the United States and 
Yemen in their fight against al-Qaeda, the plan has turned more citizens against America 
and in turn is less likely to help the government in the war. However, Sohlman continues 
on to mention how the Ambassador to Yemen believed the battle should be fought, 
“Assessing U.S. policy in Yemen, Ambassador Hull, who has long argued that the United 
States needs to implement a sustained two-pronged approach with a focus on security and 
development, said that even before the current turmoil, U.S. counter-terrorism inside 
Yemen has been largely ineffective” (Sohlman 2011). With the Ambassador of Yemen 
believing that the current plan of action by the United States led coalition, listening to his 
idea seems like the most prudent course of action. As Sohlman continues, “A 
comprehensive focus on Yemen’s economic and political problems, it (a letter written by 
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Ambassador Hull along with Yemeni officials) continues ‘will better serve the stability of 
Yemen and, accordingly, our national security interests, rather than … direct military 
involvement” (Sohlman 2011). McIntosh dives further into the unsuccessful nature of the 
United States’ plan of action against AQAP.  
The U.S. Strategy vis-à-vis Al Qaeda has created a catch-22 – the proves 
of fighting the war on Al Qaeda makes it increasingly difficult to achieve 
the stated end of eradicating the threat from Al Qaeda. Unlike a war with a 
state or a breakaway group, so long as Al Qaeda merely exists it remains 
“un-defeated” both in a literal sense and in terms laid out by the Obama 
administration – “effective destruction”… If negotiating an end to the 
conflict is off the table because it recognizes the continuing existence of 
Al Qaeda then war is likely to continue indefinitely. (McIntosh 2015)  
McIntosh brings light to an important problem with a war-like strategy to combat 
terrorism in the fact that there is no end because of the language and tactics used focused 
on the only end coming via the eradication of a worldwide terror organization. The 
likelihood of achieving a complete stop in the recruiting of al-Qaeda along with being 
able to track down and bring to justice every member of the group is very slight. Taking 
any end that involved negotiating out of the equation because that would recognize the 
group and give them even more recognition and power hindering the ability to stop the 
threat that al-Qaeda poses to the world. Author Christina Hellmich has her own sense of 
the problems that exist and where they have gone wrong in Yemen. Hellmich’s first point 
revolves around the need for the current regime and President Hadi’s ability to 
consolidate the powers within the government. “While this election enjoyed the support 
of both the ruling party and the opposition and has been hailed by the international 
community as a success for democracy, the fact that he was the sole candidate suggests 
that Yemen still has some way to go before it achieves political maturity” (Hellmich 
2012). For Yemen to ever have an ability to truly defeat AQAP, they must come together 
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as a country. If the country can’t unite, it is facing three different groups training to gain 
control of an already fragile region. This continued conflict only serves to hinder any 
progressive development from taking place. Hellmich talks about this lack as 
development as another issue that must be figured out before Yemen has a chance to 
reduce the footprint that AQAP has.  
Nearly half the population lives on less than US$2 per day; national 
unemployment is at 40 percent; less than 40 percent of Yemeni 
households have access to safe water and electricity; 50 percent of 
Yemenis are illiterate.38 Yemen’s crude death rate and crude birth rate are 
estimated at 9.0 and 39.7 per 1,000 population, respectively, while the 
fertility rate of 4.1 ranks among the highest in the region.39 State funded 
health and educational services are abysmal. Corruption and inefficiency, 
for which the country is notorious, are linked to the government’s inability 
to provide adequate social services at the most basic level. 
 
These statistics show that the country is not prepared for any sort of conflict because the 
conflict hinders any humanitarian aid that Yemen may receive to try and fix these issues. 
These statistics also create a large issue because, as stated above, AQAP is exploiting the 
citizen’s need for some of the basic necessities of life, and their using their ability to 
provide these necessities they gain the support of the citizens that they are helping.  
  Community based policing has become the newest trend in crime prevention, 
particularly in the western world to prevent terrorism. In the post 9/11 world, the more 
people you have looking for the signs of possible trouble the more likely that the trouble 
can be stopped before any incident can happen. The White House released a publication 
in August of 2011 highlighting the new plan for the United States to counter the 
possibility of terrorism on its soil. It states that the federal government will do more to 
support local communities in order for those local law enforcement agencies to gain the 
trust of the citizens. This is a large step in showing why community based policing 
12 
 
should be an effective strategy in combating terrorism when it has been implemented in 
the hegemonic power. As author Peter Grabosky puts it “They have been encouraged to 
look upon the public as clients, and to develop a customer focus. In many western 
democracies, role of police is now to serve, rather than to dominate” (Grabosky 2008). 
This shifts the power structure away from the police and into the hands of the public, and 
when this shift occurs the police will be able to gain the trust allowing them to catch 
terrorists who are committing other petty crimes in order to fund and carry out terrorist 
attacks. Charlotte Gill conducted a study to “investigate the extent which community-
oriented policing impacts crime, disorder, fear of crime, citizen satisfaction with police 
and police legitimacy…” (Gill 2014) Her results showed that community policing 
strategies increase the public satisfaction, police legitimacy, and the citizens’ response to 
disorder however it could not identify whether community policing made people fear 
crime less or if it had an effect on officially recorded crimes. Community policing allows 
for the ability to stop what Bonino (2012) identifies as the four major strategies driving 
international terrorism.  
Theoretical Framework 
This section goes in depth about the current struggles counter terror strategies 
have within the country of Yemen, mainly in their battle against AQAP and the way that 
community policing could help the country improve against AQAP and why it helps in 
these fights. Counter-terrorism strategies within Yemen have been highly unsuccessful 
due to numerous reasons, but the two largest reasons come from the stronghold that 
AQAP has been allowed to build in the southern region of the country and the fact that 
currently the counter-terrorism strategy is too closely linked to war like tactics used to 
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fight terrorism. Community policing allows for a softer approach against the terror group 
and allow a grassroots movement of the civilians to help fight back against AQAP in 
their own way.  
            The highly unsuccessful strategies in the struggle against AQAP stem from two 
major issues; the fact that the United States is leading the counter terror charge within the 
country, treating it as a foreign war instead of as a mainly homegrown issue within 
Yemen and the fact that AQAP was allowed to gain and maintain a stronghold within the 
southern region of Yemen. The current United States led counter terror strategy comes 
from the same tactics that are currently being used around the Middle East in war zones 
by American troops. This type of militaristic approach to counter terrorism will only 
reinforce the ideology that AQAP is feeding the people of Yemen about Western 
imperialization and that they are the enemy invading the holy land. It is this rhetoric that 
allows AQAP to recruit for the fight against the official Yemeni Government, as well as 
abroad against the Western powers. This current ideological path of recruiting is what 
makes AQAP the largest terrorist threat to the Western world, as seen in the Charlie 
Habo attacks in Paris. The other issue with this current war-like strategy that is being 
deployed in Yemen, is according to Christopher McIntosh is “Historically speaking, 
modern wars require negotiated conclusion or the complete eradication of present and 
future threats. The former is politically impossible and the latter is historically 
unachievable” (McIntosh 2015). These two historical outcomes are nearly impossible to 
execute when facing an ideologically driven enemy which leads them to be 
counterproductive in counter-terrorism because the violence only perpetuates more 
violence and hatred never allowing for a full dismantling of the terrorist group, always 
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leading to more terrorists being recruited. This current war-like counter-terrorism strategy 
is not the answer, and has never been a successful plan in order to defeat terrorism, so we 
must look to change this strategy in order to lessen the threat that AQAP presents both 
locally in Yemen and globally.  
           When fighting against terrorism there are two approaches that can be taken. First, 
there is the hard power approach which is the use of force and coercion typically by the 
use of the military, economic sanctions, or coercive tactics by the government to get the 
result desired. We see this in the current counter terror strategies implemented by the 
United States throughout the world. The second option is soft power, a term coined by 
Harvard professor Joseph Nye, refers to the ability to persuade or affect change through 
cultural influence and betterment of everyday life. Community policing is the best 
representation of soft power and is the answer to the current problem of an unsuccessful 
war-like counter-terrorism strategy. “AQAP has such a strong hold on the civilian 
population that the community population believes it has no other option but to give into 
the demands of AQAP. If community based policing was implemented it would give the 
civilian population an outlet to improve its situation without being controlled by AQAP” 
(Simcox 2015). As Simcox points out, the biggest weapon that can be used against 
AQAP is the civilian population itself. Using the civilian population as an extension of 
the governmental force, as seen in Israel, or as a working partnership with the 
government, as seen in the United Kingdom and the United States, can give the civilians 
an outlet to fight back, as well as hindering AQAP’s ability to recruit the local population 
weakening their stronghold. AQAP’s major recruiting ability was the ability to provide 
for the civilians every day necessities in Yemen better then either of the more legitimate 
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government forms in the current regime or the al-Houthi movement. Soft power has the 
ability to shift the civilian support towards the side of the Yemeni Government by 
allowing them to provide what they need instead of getting it from AQAP.  With 
community policing the current regime could hinder AQAP’s ability to grow throughout 
the country, and help improve the lives of its citizens improving the countries 
relationship.  
Methods and Analysis 
This study is a comparative case study of community policing and its 
effectiveness in the realm of counter-terrorism. I compare the way that the United States, 
the United Kingdom and Israel use different forms of community policing to help in their 
counter-terror efforts in their different circumstances. Taking into account each of the 
countries approaches to combat terrorism, I am able to assess which would most likely be 
able to help Yemen in its fight against AQAP. When given the opportunity to have 
multiple options that can be effective against counterterrorism operations, to be able to 
pick the best option is a luxury rarely seen in the realm of foreign policy. When looking 
at the United States and the United Kingdom, the positives that can be gained from 
community policing aspects in their counterterrorism efforts. Meanwhile, Israel has been 
using its community policing counter-terror model since 1974 in a volatile area of the 
world with significant amounts of success. So with all of the cases having relative 
success, these three cases seem to be the most relevant and fruitful examples of using 
community policing to fight terrorism. Seeing which of these options and the various 
adaptations of community policing would be most helpful within Yemen can change the 
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perceptions of how community policing impacts the fight against terrorism around the 
world.  
The Israeli Model 
Israel is the only Middle Eastern country that the study decided to include due to 
the fact that it is the most successful with their counter terrorism strategy. Located 
between Egypt and Lebanon with a partial coastline of the Mediterranean Sea, Israel was 
given an official statehood in 1948 following the end of World War 2 and has been 
marred by some form of military readiness from that day forward. Israel was never 
accepted by the Arab countries that surrounded the Jewish state. Palestine was given 
statehood around the same time and believed the land that was given to Israel should 
have been given to them, creating tensions between the countries since the inception. 
Israel fought a series of wars throughout the next half century against the surrounding 
Muslim countries and was able to fend for itself in the conventional wars.  Counter 
terrorism has become more of a focus after more radical Muslim groups became more 
powerful throughout the surrounding countries, especially Palestine, at the turn of the 
century. With groups like Hamas and Hezbollah being given more legitimacy in the 
neighboring state has led to Israel deal with terrorism on a more regular basis, making 
them the only model that has to combat terrorism in the same manner that Yemen would.  
 “The police in Israel have a special role due to the unique security situation, 
ethnic diversity, and significant political, religious, and cultural differences and tensions. 
At the same time, Israel is a democratic country where the police are obligated to protect 
civil rights and are restrained and regulated by law, and where an independent Supreme 
Court plays a dominant role” (Perry and Tal 2014). Israel gives an interesting look at 
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what community policing can and cannot do for a country that is ravaged with terrorism 
and diversity being intertwined in everyday life. In Israel, unlike many of the other 
democracies around the world, counter-terrorism needs are not something that is new to 
them. Counter-terrorism has been on the radar of the Israel National Police (INP) since 
the country’s inception. The INP has maintained a semi-militaristic set up in terms of its 
organizational structure, which allows it to be an efficient police force. Their many 
responsibilities as defined by law include,  “preventing crime, investigating and clearing 
crime, identifying offenders and bringing them to justice, supervising and controlling 
traffic, maintaining public order and safety, and maintaining ‘internal security’” (Perry 
and Tal 2014). This last responsibility of internal security was added following a rise of 
Palestinian terror attacks in 1974. However, it is also last on the list because as Peel 
suggested, the first duty of any police force is to the civilians of a given country, in this 
case Israel. This basic principles application also led to the formation of the largest 
volunteer organization in Israel, the Civil Guard, which consists of 75,000 volunteers 
helping local police in a variety of responsibilities. While the INP is largely similar to 
Western democracies in terms of organizational structures, they do have the glaring 
difference because the INP isn’t solely responsible for keeping the peace, like a local law 
enforcement agencies in those Western democracies, the INP has other government 
agencies that oversee the public safety aspects.  
 The INP is not just about preventing and controlling terrorism. It is a much larger 
strategy designed to counter the goals of terrorist organizations by empowering the local 
population and providing a way for terrorism to be marginalized within the everyday life 
of the Israeli citizens. The INP face a very similar problem to the country of Yemen in 
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the fact that they can’t just curb the threat of terrorism, they have such a problem with it 
they need to rid their country of the terrorist organization operating in the country. The 
INP has taken the approach of using the local population in a capacity that allows them to 
help hinder terrorist activity and even assist the police during terrorist attacks. This 
allows the citizens to feel like they are part of the fight against terrorism strengthening 
their bond with the police force in Israel. The INP also uses education in their community 
policing strategy to incorporate the citizens into the fight against terrorism.  
 “The police play a central role in educating members of the 
public, from an early age, to be aware of indications of possible 
terrorism events and to report their suspicions to the police. For 
example, police visit elementary schools to meet with children; 
they issue warning to be alert regarding suspicious objects or 
people in shopping areas; and they request that citizens provide 
information if they observe suspicious activities. In addition, once 
information about a terrorist in an area is available, the police 
immediately make announcements though the media, warning the 
public to stay away from crowded places and to be alert” 
(Wiseburd 2014). 
 
This education that begins at a young age plays a huge role as it can shape the minds 
of the citizens at an impressionable age and demonstrates to those children, as well as the 
children’s parents, that the police are there to help them help themselves. According to 
Wiseburd, this is a highly successful strategy proven by the over 200,000 calls received 
and respond to by the police bomb squad. While most of the tips are often false alarms, 
the police still respond as if it were a live threat in order to show the public they are 
responsive and encourage the public to continue helping the police in preventing 
terrorism. The largest force behind the cooperative effort of the civilians and the INP is 
the Civil Guard. This volunteer organization is made up of citizens, under the control and 
supervision of the police, who patrol local communities with the powers of police 
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officers. While the Civil Guard has many responsibilities and options for ways to 
volunteer, the largest and most significant on issues of homeland security. They help in a 
variety of ways such as crowd control following a terrorist attack, setting up roadblocks, 
and helping remove human remains in accordance with Jewish law. The types of 
responsibilities they continue to help soothe the transition between police and civilians in 
high tensions scenarios, where having a local face helps to ease the panic. The volunteers 
work with the local operation centers to prevent terrorist and criminal activities in their 
home communities. Allowing these volunteers to patrol their local areas with the 
authority to curb not only terrorism, but also other local criminal issues, builds trust 
between the police and the community. 
 “The Israeli model for policing terrorism seeks to minimize the impacts of 
terrorism on the everyday routines of Israeli citizens. Simply stated, its goal is to allow 
the population to act as if terrorism did not exist, even during periods in which terrorist 
threats are high” (Wiseburd 2014). The Israeli Government has made its counter-
terrorism approach focus around the community. They do not want to allow terrorists to 
hinder the day-to-day lives of their citizens and this puts the police in a positive light in 
the eyes of those who they swear to serve and protect. These positive attitudes towards 
police then makes the citizens want to go out and help in the fight by joining the Civil 
Guard and creating a cycle that hinders the ability of terrorists to operate in the local 
areas.  
The United Kingdom Model  
The United Kingdom has taken a new approach to their counter-terrorism efforts 
since the attacks since the terror attacks in London and Glasgow. “In dealing with the 
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threat posed by Islamic terrorism, the UK has deployed a multi-faceted strategy called 
CONTEST (an acronym for “Counter-Terrorism Strategy”), which aims to “Pursue”, 
“Prevent, “Protect”, and “Prepare” the country in the face of potential terrorist attacks” 
(Bonino 2012). To complete this multi-faceted strategy, they employ both high policing 
methods and low policing methods to best operate their counterterror strategies. The best 
example of the UK using community policing in a counter-terrorism capacity is the 
Muslim Contact Unit (MCU), a specialized unit within the Metropolitan Police.  
 In a topic as broad as counter-terrorism, the two major schools of thoughts are 
high policing, or hard power, and low policing, or soft power. High policing is what 
Americans think about most often when talking about counter-terrorism as it brings in the 
aspects of infringing upon the civil rights of the populous in order to stop terrorism. Hard 
policing in the sense of the UK counter-terrorism strategy has been admittedly used. “In 
deploying massive anti-terrorist legislation, surveillance and control the British 
Government openly admitted that, in dealing with terrorist threats and extreme Islamism, 
‘some of our counter-terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in 
the Muslim community’” (Bonino 2012). This usage of hard policing in the UK is shown 
in the “pursue” and “prevent” portions of their counter-terrorism strategy. The usage of 
high policing puts a large strain on the relationship between the police and the civilians 
because of its intrusive nature on the civilians. We have also seen this type of high 
policing in the United States’ “War on Terror” strategy in a short-term solution to a long-
term problem. While there is a time, place and condition in which every country must use 
high policing tactics, its necessity is to be used sparingly by the British in their counter-
terror strategy. Low policing is what we have been focusing on in this study, community 
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policing and playing the “long game” in order to eliminate terrorism through ending the 
grassroots spread. “This model aims to employ community-based counter-terrorism 
approaches to impact Muslim communities and improve communications, marginalize 
extremists and favor social integration” (Bonino 2012). This model is also called the 
inclusionary model because of its ability to bring a marginalized section of the populous 
and bring them into the fold of the country, making them feel like it is their country as 
well instead of outsiders in a foreign land. The reason this philosophy is so successful is 
because it reduces the ability of terrorist organizations to recruit as many members within 
the UK by reducing the number of marginalized members of the country. “In Line with 
the low policing strand of CONTEST mentioned before, community policing activities 
could promote better dialogue; isolate extremists; and further social integration of 
Muslim with the wider society” (Bonino 2012). Britain uses an interesting combination 
of high and low policing methods to further the country’s fight against homegrown 
terrorism. 
 One of the most successful ways that the United Kingdom has employed is the 
Muslim Contact Unit (MCU). This is the best example of community policing within the 
United Kingdom by being a small unit that specializing in community policing within the 
Muslim communities. The current MCU commander is Robert Lambert, who Bonino 
quotes as saying,  
“When torture is replaced by trust building you have the basis of a solid 
partnership that can reduce the impact of al-Qaida propaganda in the 
communities where it seeks recruits and supporters. It has also the 
potential to address the real root causes of terrorism and provide viable 




Having the leader of an agency such as the MCU, whose purpose is to go out and actively 
engage the Muslim community shows the concerted effort by the authoritative figure to 
the marginalized community to improve the situation. However, according to Basia 
Spalek, the authoritative figure of the MCU may not be the only thing necessary to truly 
reach the community as a whole. Spalek asserts that there may need to be a ‘connector’ 
position as well. These connectors are people who are from and still in the community, 
like guidance counselors, social workers and young professionals in the community, who 
can bridge the gap and bring the two sides closer. Spalek continues “Within the context 
of countering takfiri jihadist terrorism, connectors seem to be people who are able to 
negotiate ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’ in order to build relationships with people so as to 
create environments conductive to implanting counter-terrorism initiatives” (Spalek 
2014).  These connectors can prove to be the element that brings the United Kingdom’s 
counter-terrorism plan truly successful. The community trusts these connectors to do 
what is best for the communities because of the inherently tight knit communities that 
Muslim communities tend to have. Much like the Israeli Civil Guard, Spalek contends 
that it is important to have these connectors responding to threats of violence. In an 
interview with a Muslim community member, he spoke about an interaction the 
community had when a racist group was holding a march in their community, 
“…on the day I managed to speak to young people and dissuaded about a 
group of 20 to leave you, the area and go back, because I knew them… so 
they left. So again, that relationship building, the police were seeing that 
happening… the Silver Commander (senior police officer) on the ground 
was about to do something and I was there at the time and I felt that if 
he’d done that it wouldn’t have worked, so he pulled me to the side and 




The police response to certain incidents that happen within the community is seen as 
marginalizing the community. However, if a member of that community acts as a middle 
man between the civilians and the police it can deescalate the situation and have a 
positive outcome overall.  
 The United Kingdom has a progressive take on counter-terrorism, bringing in 
both high and low policing methods to balance the pressures on the community with their 
involvement in the overall country. The UK does a great job using specialized groups like 
the MCU to continue to work with Muslim communities in counter-terror efforts. As 
well, the UK uses connectors within the community to help ease the tensions should they 
arise between the police and the civilian population. 
 The American Model 
 The United States has become the leader for the counterterrorism movement in 
recent history. Following the events of September 11th, 2001, the world’s superpower 
became the first in the fight against Al-Qaeda throughout the Middle East. Counter 
terrorism became looked at as something that could be solved through military actions as 
that was the first way that the United States tried to combat the violence. In both 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States led military first operations that didn’t have the 
intended result of stamping out terrorism and stopping organizations from furthering their 
recruiting processes and eliminating the threat they pose to exterior governments. It 
wasn’t until the Obama administration took control that community policing was looked 
at as a manner for fighting against terrorism, particularly against the homegrown 
terrorism that began to become more commonplace. Homegrown terrorism is the act of 
terrorism perpetuated by American citizens, either at home or abroad according to the 
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Congressional Research Service. As homegrown terrorism grew, the United States 
realized that the fight against terrorism, mainly al-Qaeda and its affiliates, could not be a 
military endeavor and needed to be fought with a different mentality.  
This section shows the American model for community policing as a counter-
terrorism method. I start by giving the American definition of community policing and 
the effects that has on the strategy. The American model of community policing as a 
manner of counter-terrorism strategy takes bits and pieces from both the British model 
and the Israeli model that allow them to focus on maximizing the effectiveness of 
community policing benefits. “The United States Department of Justice has defined 
community policing as a philosophy that focuses on crime and social disorder through the 
delivery of police services that includes aspects of traditional law enforcement, as well as 
prevention, problem-solving, community engagement and partnerships” (Docobo). This 
definition is the code in which the American model is focused on in a manner that brings 
people together as opposed to having the citizens fear the police. Author Ben Brown 
breaks this theory down in even more detail when he goes into his opinion of the 
American model of community policing, “At its core, community policing is composed 
of two essential elements: (i) quality relations between law enforcement and the citizenry, 
and (ii) concerted problem-solving efforts among law enforcement officers and local 
residents which focus on identifying and eliminating the cause of crime in the 
community” (Brown 2013). This more simplistic version of the Department of Justice’s 
definition rings similar to the other uses of community policing around the world. These 
can be seen as common threads throughout the cases as the basis for the community 
policing as a counter-terrorism strategies. However, to the best of my research abilities, 
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the American model is the only one that tries to put an actual definition to the put the 
practice into words. This aspect is different from the rest of the world because it not only 
gives police a better understanding of what is to be expected from them and it allows the 
citizenry to understand what is to be expected from the police. When the citizenry can 
hold the governmental forces accountable for their actions, and how the operate, it can be 
beneficial to the end product; which in terms of counter-terrorism can mean a more 
successful partnership between the citizenry and the government. 
The American model takes many different aspects of community policing that we 
have seen around the world be highly successful. First, they took the British model and 
adapted their practices in their own way. “The core goal of the new U.S. strategy 
(community policing as a counter-terrorism method) is ‘to prevent violent extremist and 
their supports from inspiring, radicalizing, financing or recruiting individuals or groups in 
the United States to commit acts of violence. This initiative, at least in its core focus, 
closely emulates the goal of Prevent” (Brown 2013). The movement to prevent terror 
before it happens shows the change in philosophy from the United States. They have 
shifted to a proactive form of counter-terrorism, much like each of the other cases, which 
allows the country to involve the citizenry in the information gathering process. This new 
role for the citizenry brings the next important change to the counter-terrorism strategy, 
the aspect of relationship building. Relationship building is the backbone of a community 
policing strategy in its truest form, but is especially important for counter-terrorism 
implications. When the relationships are built, it gives an extreme advantage for law 
enforcement because the citizenry knows their neighborhoods better then law 
enforcement ever can as an outsider. As author Jose Decobo states, “It will generally be 
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citizens who observe the unusual – groups of men living in apartments or motels, or 
unusual behavior at flight schools – in their own community, and would be expected to 
report such observations to the local police” (Decobo). These small changes can be 
reported if the relationship between law enforcement and the citizens is strong, while if it 
is not built, these proactive tips the police can potentially receive fall through the crack. 
The key to the success of relationship building is not focusing solely on terrorism as the 
only issue. As Dan Silk points out, “This represents a key consideration for U.S. law 
enforcement agencies as they seek to build genuine partnerships with these 
neighborhoods. Close, productive relationships between police and the community defy 
artificially imposed boundaries, yet they periodically may emphasize counter-terrorism” 
(Silk 2012). This key consideration can be toppled however if law enforcement doesn’t 
embrace the Peelian principles of community policing. Grabosky points out, Regardless 
of terrorist threats; day-to-day protection of the community remains the responsibility of 
local police. It is now generally accepted that mutual respect and trust between police and 
the communities they serve are essential” (Grabosky 2008). Especially within the US, 
terrorists often use common crimes to fund their activities, and that is when the 
community is the proactive member of community policing, pointing out those who start 
to go outside of their norms, or the community norms, to the police.  
The last way the American model emulates the models of the other cases is the 
use of volunteer resources. Much like the Civil Guard in Israel, President George W. 
Bush called for “greater citizen involvement in homeland security through initiatives 
such as the Citizen Corps and Freedom Corps” (Docobo).  Following 9/11, the Citizen 
Corps was separated into four different groups and methods that could affect help; 
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Neighborhood Watch, Volunteers in Police Service (VIPS), Community Emergency 
Response Teams (CERT), and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). Neighborhood Watch 
programs have been in practice for over three decades, however following 9/11, they 
have slightly changed their role to now include terrorism awareness. Teaching those in 
their communities about what signs to look for and what may be helpful to police when 
suspicious activities do take place. It also acts as the same role as the “connector” roles 
seen in the United Kingdom. Volunteers in Police Service are in place to perform duties 
that allow sworn officers to focus on other, more priority, duties that they have. With the 
increase of duties that are asked of law enforcement following September 11th, this 
allows the police to be out in the communities, serving the citizenry with day-to-day 
crime and building a relationship within the district they have been assigned. Community 
Emergency Response Teams are civilians who have been trained in emergency planning 
and response in order to assist law enforcement should an attack happen. Following the 
move into the Citizen Corps, CERT teams have increased their job responsibilities in 
order to be able to provide assistance not only to first responders but to victims 
themselves, as well as being able to bring together volunteers from within the community 
at a disaster site. They also help prepare their communities for disasters to improve its 
safety when an attack has not happened yet. Lastly, the Medical Reserve Corps is a group 
of citizens with a background or interest in the medical field who can assist the EMT’s 
and medical professionals in times of crisis. They can also provide knowledge on how the 
community should prepare themselves in terms of medical supplies and strategies to be 
prepared for any incident that may come. These volunteer outlets are created by the 
relationships brought about by community policing.  
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How does this affect Yemen? 
 Yemen as a test case made for a variety of positives and negatives for each of the 
models of community policing that I looked into. With only one overwhelming negative 
seen throughout each case makes it difficult to say that any of these methods would 
benefit Yemen. However, if the negative aspect of the need for a strong centralized 
government could be fixed, the positives that each of these models bring could truly 
change the future of Yemen and help the fight against terrorism around the world.  
Each of the cases I studied were excellent examples on how community policing 
could hinder terrorist activity within the country, I also picked three countries with solid, 
highly functioning central governments to help run their versions of community policing. 
Yemen does not yet have this strong centralized government, as it is not only fighting 
AQAP, which has made a case to become the new Government of Yemen, but also the al-
Houthi rebels who have been fighting against the regime for almost its entire existence. 
Without a strong central government, you have no foundation for a community policing 
system, and currently the country of Yemen does not have any resemblance of a strong 
central government making it nearly impossible to implement the best strategy to defeat 
AQAP. Common trends among the models such as volunteer forces and relationship 
building between the community and the officers rely on the fact that the government is 
running efficiently enough to put these programs into place.  
While we can see the downfall of not having a governing body that is well 
functioning and strong, that alone doesn’t discount many of the ideas and themes of the 
other models as possible solutions for the Yemeni problem with terrorism. Incorporating 
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the civilian population within your counter terrorism plan would be an extremely 
successful plan of action for the country of Yemen. With Yemen having twenty-two 
governorates, basically states, allowing for these different governorates to provide their 
own protection against AQAP you will see the additional manpower and resources being 
added to the fight. If implemented like the Israeli Civil Guard with standing positions and 
an eye on dealing with local problems in order to allow the well trained professionals to 
handle  actual terrorist threats it would help rebuild the trust between the government and 
the civilian population. You will create a better equipped fighting force by following the 
western lead of allowing the civilian population to help themselves as well as the country 
in the fight against AQAP.  
 Another major feature of community policing that can allow Yemen to combat 
AQAP’s activity in the country is an educational process to allow the youth of the 
country. This would create a grassroots movement that would further detract from 
AQAP’s ability to recruit from these at risk populations within the country. However, 
while education may be easier in the western powers like the United Kingdom and the 
United States, you see the Israeli use of the educational system in order to help defeat 
terrorism as a method that can help long term over short term. The way the Israeli’s 
approach teaching children about terrorism, and what they should do if they see or know 
of terrorism would be much more effective than the western ways for Yemen because 
both Yemen and Israel have terrorism actively on the mind every day. It is a way of life 
in both countries and that allows the children to start with a better understanding of the 
damage that can be done by terrorists. By starting the educational process early in life, 
you allow generational change to take place, the children will grow up knowing the 
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dangers of terrorism along with ways that the government is asking for their help to fight 
terrorism will change the culture surrounding terrorism in the country, making it a 
civilian led campaign to stop terrorism.  
 When looking at the three different models I’ve applied to Yemen, the Israeli 
Model is the most efficient for implementation and effectiveness. The reasoning behind 
this is because of the proximity to the terrorism itself. When you look at the United 
Kingdom and United States Models, they have both been highly successful in stopping 
terrorism from popping up in their country, however does not do much in order to solve 
the actual problem of terrorism. In Israel, as well as Yemen, terrorism is part of everyday 
life. The terrorists are much more likely to live in your city, be your neighbor and be 
known to you. It is already an established part of life, and it is much more difficult to root 
out something that has already been established in your country. The Yemeni 
Government, once it has solidified and strengthened itself within the country, can follow 
the Israeli Model more easily because the Israeli Model came about when the country 
was created. The Yemeni Government can add the counter terrorism strategies to their 
new model for government after figuring out their downfalls that stop them from being as 
successful as other governments in the region.  
Conclusion 
 This section is going to be a brief overview of the study where I review the 
project as it stands. Following that I review the flaws within my own research, mainly the 
issue with trying to implement community policing in a country where the central 
government is in shambles and the difficulties of how we are defining what community 
31 
 
truly is. Lastly, I look towards what future researchers could study in order to add onto 
my research.  
 I began this project with a simple question, how would adopting community 
policing concepts help the fight against AQAP? Throughout the paper, we looked at the 
current strategies that were being discussed and implemented into Yemen to fight the 
terrorist organization along with how countries have used community policing in order to 
strengthen their own country’s counter-terrorism procedures. The outcome being that it 
seems where it has been put into effect, community policing has been extremely 
successful in hindering terrorist movements and attacks by combining certain community 
policing principles with other, more traditional, counter-terrorism measures as seen in all 
three cases. Unfortunately, none of these cases have the ability to be replicated or even 
modeled after because of the lack of a central Government in Yemen.  This lack of 
governmental control leads to an inability to implement the necessary help for the 
community to get involved with the fight against AQAP in the country. This also hinders 
any counter-terror plan from being able to be put into effect because the government does 
not have enough control within its own borders to implement a cohesive strategy.  
 When delving deeper into the problems of Yemen, I believe that there are two 
major areas of research that could make a large contribution not only to the world of 
academia but also to the practice of counter-terrorism and unity within Middle Eastern 
countries. The first area of research continuation that is integral to the process of 
defeating AQAP is how one could bring together the two sides to form a stronger 
government in Yemen to help the countries fight against the terrorist organization. In 
doing this, I believe that it would open avenues to help bring the country together and 
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empower the citizens to join the fight with community policing to push back AQAP. 
Once the country was able to come together as a unified front, it allows for more 
strategies to be on the table when talking about ways that the country can fight back 
against terrorism. The other area of research to consider is an actual implementation 
strategy for community policing in the country. It was a theme I saw throughout many of 
the current research articles, that implementation strategy is one of the most important 
factors of community policing because if done improperly it can have disastrous 
consequences for both the government agencies as well as the civilians attempting to help 
them. This is a factor because with how the country of Yemen currently is, it would be 
much harder to implement a strategy like the United States or United Kingdom models, 
however if it could be worked into the DNA of the country, like it is in the Israeli model 
it could seamlessly be transitioned to. While community based policing does seem to be 
the best option in terms of stopping terrorism, the country of Yemen has some work to do 
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